

first draft: 2

I have directed our military forces...
Secondly, (close surveillance); ; to take
further military action if that build-up continues, threatens
and so requires;

((final: should these offensive military preparations
continue, thus increasing the threat to the Hemisphere,
further action will be justified. I have directed the
Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust
that in the interests of both the Cuban people and the
Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned
of continuing this threat will be recognized.))

...to include these air and missile bases on the targeting system
of our strategic and retaliatory forces; and finally, to
regard any missile launched from Cuba as an attack by the SU
requiring a massive retaliatory response upon the SU.

((final: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard
any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation
in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the SU upon
the US, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the SU.))

(contrast McN backgrounder, Oct 22. Controversy, reasons,
on this wording?)

...
I am asking Soviet Chairman Khrushchev, who will shortly be
coming to the UN meeting in New York, to meet with me at the
earliest opportunity with respect to this provocative threat to
world peace and the relations between our two countries.

((I call upon Chairman K to halt and eliminate this clan-
destine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace
and to stable relations between our two nations.))

...But we will not negotiate with a gun at our heads--a gun
that imperils innocent Cubans as well as Americans. Our byword
is: "Negotiation yes, intimidation no!" That is why this threat--
or any other threat which is made independently or in response
to our blockade--must and will be met with determination; and
therefore, while any talks go on, our forces all over the world
will be alert--and the blockade will remain.

(: But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these
problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why...
made independently or in response to our actions this week--
(last part deleted).))

One path we shall never choose--the path of ~~xxmississ~~ surrender
or submission. I tell you, therefore, that these missiles now
in Cuba will someday go--and no others will take their place.

((last sentence deleted))

TCS first draft, 20 Oct

(Sept 11, Gromyko statements). The USA need not and cannot tolerate defiance, deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small.

(final: Neither the US nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small.) (Suez?)

We no longer live in a world where only an actual "armed attack" as Article 51 of the UN Charter originally intended the phrase, represents a challenge to a nation's security.

(We no longer...where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril.)

Nuclear weapons are so destructive, and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantial increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in the nature of their threat, may well require an act of self-defense.

(...or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.)

.....
Nevertheless American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles located inside the USSR or in submarines. In that sense, our danger has not been greatly increased. ((in pencil: ~~is~~ not been altered in kind but has been substantially increased.))

(final: In that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger ((third draft, 21 Oct: simply add)) --although it should be noted that the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat.)

blockade: And let me make it clear that it will not only prevent completion of the current offensive build-up. It will also require the Soviet Union to choose between fighting the American Navy in American waters, or abandoning its obligations to Mr. Castro. It will also have, in a comparatively short time, a profound effect on the military, economic and political underpinnings of the Castro regime; and it will be continued until all missiles and offensive bases are gone from that island.

(final: deleted.)

drafts: 3

Original deprecates ~~xxxxxx~~ military significance, emphasizes "defiance," deception. Final stresses increased threat, provocative change, clandestine move, threat to Latin America.

First amounts to justifying preventive or preemptive attack.

Initial emphasizes blockade as answer; only provisionally mentions possibility of further military action; says missiles will go someday.

Final emphasizes possibility of further military if preparations continue; implies action this week; does not emphasize blockade as answer to buildup.

Initial suggests summit conf, negotiation as answer to continued buildup; final does not.

Initial merely quotes Sept 11 and Gromyko; third draft calls Sept 11 statement "patently false and misleading," calls Gromyko statements "dishonest and dishonorable."

Final: calls both false.

Oct 20: Political program to be announced by the President

1. Recent developments with respect to offensive capability in Cuba constitute the gravest threat to the peace and security of the Caribbean area as well as to the world. Thus the can and should be discussed by the Security Council and measures should be taken to avert any immediate ~~xx~~ danger and to find, through negotiation, permanent solution to the problem.
2. Ambassador Stevenson will propose to the Security Council tomorrow (?) (sic) a resolution whereby the UN would dispatch immediately observation teams to all strategic nuclear missile sites maintained on the territory of any country other than the three major nuclear powers. These observation teams, which would be placed in Cuba, Italy, and Turkey, would insure that no surprise attack could be mounted in any of these countries pending a permanent solution to the problem of foreign missile bases.
3. If the SU justifies these missile bases in Cuba as necessary to guarantee that country against foreign invasion, I reply that there is, in fact, no such threat to Cuba. But the US would agree, along with the other American states, to guarantee the territorial integrity of Cuba, and we propose the organization and immediate dispatch of a UN force to Cuba, modeled on the UN Emergency Force, to effectuate this guarantee. But to insure the security of the hemisphere we must insist on the prompt dismantling of these missile sites in Cuba and the withdrawal of all Soviet military personnel. Concurrently the US will evacuate our base at Guantanamo and withdraw all forces and weapons therefrom.

Because of the danger of escalation the SU's clandestine action in Cuba has endangered the whole world and demands that we all hasten the conclusion of nuclear and general disarmament before it is too late. We can draw no better lesson from this experience. And the US stands ready to consider with the Soviet Union the elimination of the NATO strategic bases situated in Italy and Turkey and all other bases on the soil of countries other than the nuclear powers in the context of the disarmament treaties now under consideration.

(another version, 20 Oct: 4. We would be prepared to implement the phased withdrawal of all American forces from Guantanamo in company with the phased withdrawal of all Sov military personnel from Cuban installations and the dismantling of the missile sites. 5. In the present state of missile technology, with its long-range capability, foreign bases add little if anything to either Soviet or American missile potential. For this reason the US would be ~~xxxx~~ prepared to enter into ~~xx~~ negotiations with the SU looking towards the elimination of all strategic missile bases maintained on foreign soil. We would be willing to negotiate this matter either in the context of the disarmament discussions presently going forward, or independently. Note: 4 and 5 can be used alternatively or cumulatively.

((Compare to: a) US initiative on Turkey considered preceding week to soften effect of US surprise attack on missiles; b) Defanging resolution of next week.